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Euthanasia and Brain Death: 
Ethical and Legal Considerations 
Dennis J. Horan 
The author is a lecturer in law at the University of Chicago Law 
School and is chairman of the American Bar Association Committee 
on Right to Life/Right to Die. This paper is a longer version of a talk 
given at the New York Academy of Science Conference on Brain Death 
in November, 1977. 
I. 
For many years the problem of defining death was basically one of 
a simple medical judgment, a diagnosis made by a physician at the 
deathbed in a home or in a hospital) The criteria for determining 
when death occurred were medical criteria easily applied by physicians 
and seldom, if ever, questioned by the public. There existed no statu-
tory definitions of death, and the common law considered the issue 
only in relation to the distribution of property or in determining 
whether a person who had been the victim of an assault died within a 
year and a day.2 The common law defined death as a moment when 
life had ceased, "defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the 
circulation of the blood and a cessation of the animal and vital func-
tions consequent therein, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."3 Any 
more was not necessary, and so no more was undertaken. 
Then two advancing areas of medicine converged on the deathbed 
to create one of our current problems. The first of these was the 
increasing ability of medicine to resuscitate dying patients and to 
maintain those patients on sophisticated machinery. The second was 
the ability of medicine to transplant organs from one person to 
another. Both of these advances depended upon a myriad of factors 
too complicated to discuss here, but were related to the tremendous 
growth in medical technology of recent years. 
In response to the problems of resuscitation and the modern use of 
respirators, several states passed new laws redefining death in two 
ways. 4 One definition was used when the death occurred in the hos-
pital where resuscitative methods were being used. This definition 
brought in the relatively recent requirement of "brain death." The 
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other definition of death was applicable when resuscitative means 
were not involved. · This definition continued to rely on the traditional 
grounds of cessation of heartbeat and respiration. 
My concern here today is the ethical and legal considerations for 
society in adopting brain death as a basis for a diagnosis of death. I did 
not say the basis for such a diagnosis since I presume that no one 
intends but that brain death should be an additional way - albeit, the 
"sole" way - of determining death in a given case. 5 That is to say, 
where mechanical support is not in use or transplantation is not an 
issue, we would not have the problem since the diagnosis would be a 
matter of clinical judgment by the attending physician. Obviously, 
brain death is also a matter of clinical judgment, but is only too 
seldom discussed in those terms. We are not per se discussing a statu-
tory definition of death but rather two other questions: one, a broad 
philosophical, moral , ethical and legal question; and the other, a nar-
row technical medical problem. These questions are : 
1) Is a person who is brain dead really dead? If the answer is yes, 
then 
2) What means of proof that brain death has occurred is acceptable 
to society? 
Many of the sections of this conference are concerned with the 
second question. Even though I have labeled that a technical med-
ical question , there indeed can be ethical-legal problems associated 
with that question also, but those problems are not my purpose. My 
concern is with the first question: Is a person who is brain dead really 
dead? This is similar to the question we ask when we ask whether 
brain death may be a statutory criterion for defining death. However, 
to say we are defining death is really incorrect. What we mean to say 
is, "What are the criteria on which the medical diagnosis of death may 
be made?" We cannot really define death since it is the absence of life 
which we can only describe. 
II. 
If the determination of death is a diagnosis made by a physician and 
a person is dead when his brain is dead, then why can't a physician 
make such a diagnosis and declare the brain dead person to be dead? 
Why does he need a statute? In short, what are we doing here? Why 
are statutes being created to give a physician a "right" (to declare a 
brain dead person dead) he presumptively has? 
In my opinion, the answer to those questions is two-fold: 1) the 
public and public policy-makers lag behind the physician in under-
standing these concepts, and 2) some persons, indeed some physicians, 
have used the concept of brain death in a socially unacceptable way. 
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The first answer means that more and better ways of reaching the 
public and informing public opinion on these issues must be found. 
The second we must discuss further to illustrate my point. 
I do not wish to set up a straw man, but in order to clearly delin-
eate the nature of the legal-ethical problem I am about to discuss, I 
wish to choose as an example a medical article published in the Baylor 
Law Review entitled "Medical Death." 6 In that article Sheff D. 
Olinger, M.D., director of the Department of Neurology and director 
of the Stroke Unit and EEG Department of the Baylor University 
Medical School in Dallas, took great care to make a distinction in the 
issue of brain death, which distinction, in my opinion, is at the heart 
of the problem as to why some public policy-makers have refused (and 
rightly so) to accept brain death as an alternative means of defining 
death. In that paper, Dr. Olinger stated: 
I would like to distinguish the term cerebral death from brain death. The 
brain is composed of several parts, including the medulla , cerebellum, mid· 
brain, and cerebrum. We are concerned here with the cerebrum. The other 
portions of the brain may function to produce spontaneous circulation and 
respiration in the absence of the cerebrum without consciousness or aware· 
ness. When all the brain has lost its function, there is no spontaneous respi· 
ration, and usually no effective circulation. I would emphasize again that 
cerebral death and brain death are different things and that the term cere· 
bral death expresses the medical concept which is equated with death of the 
individual person. 7 
After discussing the Harvard criterion and criticizing it because it is 
highly technical and incapable of lay understanding and, more impor-
tantly, because the Harvard criteria "do not recognize the cerebral 
quality of human life, [since] the cerebrum might be totally destroyed 
without hope of recovery, although circulation and respiration could 
persist or be supported indefinitely," 8 Dr. Olinger then proceeds to put 
his finger on the heart of the matter. 
Having defined medical or scientific death as death of the cerebrum, it must 
be pointed out that this definition is not usually used in ascertainment of 
death by physicians. 9 
Dr. Olinger's last statement presents two problems, the discussion 
of which is important for us today. 1) Is that definition (death of the 
cerebrum) not used because there is a lag in the knowledge necessary 
to make a determination of death based on brain death, or 2) is it not 
used because the concept of brain death as cerebral death is not (as I 
asked previously) really death? 
Death of the cerebrum alone has not been accepted as real death in 
our society. 10 Those who push this definition of death, whether they 
realize it or not, are asking for a change in the current homicide laws 
and asking for the introduction of euthanasia, which creates for each 
of us substantial ethical problems as well. 
Although the American Medical Association has not opted for any 
definition of death, a two-part article recently published in The Jour-
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nal of the American Medical Association has reviewed the concept of 
brain death and has reported on the current status of these medical 
and ethical considerations. Throughout this two-part article continued 
reference is made to brain death as the complete destruction of brain 
function or the irreversible cessation of all brain function. The authors 
review the current ethical positions and conclude that only destruc-
tion of the entire brain constitutes an acceptable definition of death. 
Consistently throughout this article such language is used as this: 
Patients with irreversible total destruction of the brain fulfill this definition, 
even if heart action and circulation are artificially maintained . 12 
The American Bar Association in its Resolution voted and approved 
by the House of Delegates on 2/24/75 accepted as a definition of brain 
death the irreversible cessation of total brain function. However, it is 
important in considering that definition that the thrust of the entire 
Resolution be understood. The preamble to that Resolution recites 
that the concern of the medicine and law committee, which formu-
lated the Resolution after extensive research and investigation, was the 
necessity to cease all artificial life supports when someone has died and 
to maintain the best cellular condition of a donor's organs. The Reso-
lution in full reads as follows: 
WHEREAS, it is to the well being of the public to cease all artificial life 
supports, respiratory and circulatory, after a human body is dead ; and 
WHEREAS, it is currently medically established that irreversible cessation 
of b rain function is determinative of death ; and 
WHEREAS, in the current technology of organ transplants it is vital that 
the donor's gift be in the best cell ular condition, 
THEREFORE, be it resolved : that the American Bar Association offers a 
Current Definition of Death as follows: 
For all legal purposes , a human body with irreversible cessation of total 
brain function, according to usual and customary standards of m edical prac· 
tice , shall be considered dead. 
The preamble is important to keep in mind because it limits and 
explains the applicability of the resolution. The ABA definition is 
intended for those occasions when artificial means of life support are 
in use or organ donation is contemplated. Even though the definition 
includes the words "for all legal purposes," the definition is not 
intended to supplant a physician's use of his clinical judgment when 
he declares a person dead. The intent of the resolution is to aid him in 
the specific area of artificial life supports where clinical judgment, it is 
said, has become tentative and confused. 
Consequently the ABA definition does not mean that a person who 
has spontaneous respiration and circulation, but has a brain lesion 
which makes him comatose can be declared dead. So too, the 
hydranencephalic child cannot be declared brain dead under the ABA 
test because he probably has a thalmus and upper brain stem. The 
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anencephalic child is another question, but even this child - if it has 
voluntary respiration or circulation - is not brain dead under the ABA 
definition. In any event, anencephaly is incompatible with life and 
such a child will not live more than a few hours. However, even that 
child is a person under our law and is protected by the full panoply of 
legal and constitutional rights. 
In addition to the preamble to that Resolution, which is frequently 
forgotten in discussing the nature of the ABA's position on brain 
death, the advantages of such a definition, as published in the Ameri-
can Bar Association's report when it accepted this definition, are the 
following reasons in support of or as "advantages of the definition": 
1. permits judicial determination of the ultimate fact of death ; 
2. permits medical determination of the evidentiary fact of death; 
3. avoids religious determination of any facts; 
4. avoids prescribing the medical criteria; 
5. enhances changing medical criteria; 
6. enhances local medical practice tests; 
7. covers the three known tests (brain, beat and breath deaths); 
8. covers death as a process (medical preference); 
9. covers death as apoint in time (legal preference); 
10. avoids passive euthanasia; 
11. avoids active euthanasia; 
12. covers current American and European medical practices; 
13. covers both civil law and criminal law; 
14. covers current American judicial decisions ; 
15. avoids non-physical sciences. 
A fair reading of the articles concerning the medical, legal and 
ethical aspects of brain death which appeared in the October issue of 
The Journal of the American Medical Association clearly indicates 
support of the American Bar Association Resolution on brain death. 
The importance of that resolution for our discussion is its explicit 
rejection of the notion that cerebral or partial brain death are satisfac-
tory definitions. As one author stated: "Thus, destruction of the 
entire brain or brain death, and only that is consonant with biblical 
pronouncements on what constitutes an acceptable definition of 
de a th .... " 13 The article concluded that total brain death is 
acceptable as a definition of death to most Jewish, Roman Catholic 
and Protestant scholars. I would agree. 
So also, in a recent review of European practices concerning brain 
death it was said: 
The term ' cerebral death ' is too ambiguous to be adequ ate for use in any 
ser ious discussion of death because linguisticall y and m edicall y the te rm 
m eans the death of only the cerebrum and not of the en t ire brain, even 
though colloquially it encompasses both senses of the word. Th e author 
knows of no proof nor unanimous opinion that the total and irreversible 
cessation of funct ion of only the cerebrum guarantees or proves total and 
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irreversible cessation of all perceptions. Therefore, proof of the death of the 
cerebrum does not prove that the person is dead (as person is defined in this 
article ). 14 
This article states that there is no general agreement or proof that 
all levels and forms of psychic activity are produced exclusively by the 
cortex. 15 A number of German doctors state that brain stem activity 
may be able to produce primitive psychic activity. Consequently only 
the total and irreversible cessation of all brain function guarantees that 
all perception has totally and irreversibly ceased and that the person is 
medically and legally dead. This author then defines death thus: 
... death of the person occurs exclusively if and when brain death occurs, 
that is when total and irreversible cessa tion of all neuronal function in all 
p arts of the brain occurs. 16 
In my opinion, the irreversible cessation of total brain function is 
an ethically acceptable, as well as adequate legal and medical defini-
tion of death. However, death of only the cerebrum is not. 
III. 
What then are the legal and ethical implications of the distinction 
between cerebral brain death and total brain death? In discussing this 
question we should first indicate that we are not speaking about when 
it may be proper to cease treatment in a terminal case, even if that 
treatment is a Bennett respirator, such as was involved in the Quinlan 
case. My own position on that issue is that a physician is authorized 
under the standards of medical practice to discontinue a form of 
therapy which in his medical judgment is useless. He is not mandated 
by the law to render useless treatment, nor does the standard of 
medical care require useless treatment. Under those circumstances, if 
the treating physicians have determined that continued use of a res-
pirator is useless, then they may decide to discontinue it without fear 
of civil or criminal liability. By useless is meant that the continued use 
of the therapy cannot and does not improve the prognosis for recov-
ery. Even if the therapy is necessary to maintain stability, such ther-
apy should not be mandatory where the ultimate prognosis is hope-
less. This does not mean that ordinary means of life support, such as 
food and drink can be discontinued merely because the ultimate prog-
nosis is hopeless. In addition, we will reserve for some other time the 
discussion of whether or not IVs may be discontinued even under 
those circumstances. My own position is that they may not. By hope-
less is meant that the prognosis for life (not meaningful life) is very 
poor. The fact that someone mayor may not return to "sapient or 
cognitive life" mayor may not fulfill the requirement depending upon 
other medical factors, but of itself it does not. 17 The Supreme Court 
of West Germany put this idea very succinctly in its recent opinion on 
the abortion issue: 
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Where human li fe ex ists , human dignity is presen t to it ; it is not dec isive 
that the beare r of this dignity himself be co nsc io us of it and kno ws person· 
ally how to preserve it. 18 
Nor are we discussing the equally difficult legal·ethical question of 
whether, and if so when, orders not to resuscitate may be given. Such 
orders, in my opinion, should be given only when based on good 
medical judgment that the ultimate prognosis for recovery is hopeless 
and when informed consents have been obtained from the patient 
and/or the patient's family (if the patient can't consent). The order 
should be in writing and signed by the attending physician. Some 
hospitals, as has been recently suggested, may want this done by a 
committee. Some physicians are willing to give such an order, but balk 
at writing it in the record. This attitude solves little, but perhaps as an 
accommodation to this problem the physician's order could be a sep-
arate record, such as a sterilization consent form that does not become 
a part of the patient's bedside record. 
As is typical when discussing these emerging issues concerning death 
and dying, I've spent considerable time telling you what the issue is 
not. What then is the issue? In my perception of the problem of brain 
death the issue is that total brain death is an acceptable legal and 
medical manner of declaring persons dead. Cerebral death is not an 
acceptable legal, ethical, medical or moral manner of declaring persons 
dead. Cerebral death is akin to euthanasia, which is morally and legally 
unacceptable. 
IV. 
Percy Foreman has said that euthanasia is a " highfalutin ' " word for 
murder.19 Under our law euthanasia is a homicide. 20 Even though the 
one who commits euthanasia bears no ill will towards his victim and 
believes his act to be morally justified, he nonetheless acts with malice 
in the eyes of the law if he is able to comprehend that society pro-
hibits this act regardless of his personal belief. The motive of the 
perpetrator of the euthanasia is rejected as an ameliorative fact in 
American law. If the facts establish that the killing was done willfully, 
that is with intent and as a result of premeditation and deliberation, 
our law calls it murder in the first degree regardless of what the 
defendant's motive may have been.21 
Even if the homicide is committed at the request of the decedent it 
still constitutes a homicide since, as our courts have indicated, murder 
is no less murder because it is committed at the desire of the victim. 
"He who kills another upon the other's desire or command is in the 
judgment of the law as much a murderer as if he had done it merely 
from his own volition." 22 
All nations consider euthanasia the crime of homicide, although it is 
frequently indicated that Uruguay may be the one exception. 23 In a 
number of countries such as Germany, Norway, Switzerland, etc., a 
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compassionate motive or homicide on request will operate to reduce 
the penalty, but the crime remains the same - homicide. Homicide is 
no less homicide because the victim is aged, senile or near death. 24 
The criminal law has as great a respect for the young and hearty as the 
old and aged. The law teaches that mankind has not supported eutha-
nasia. It is considered a homicide by all nations and societies. 
For the medical profession our discussion of euthanasia has partic-
ular importance. Already our society has legalized abortion and has 
made the killing of the unborn an option between the mother and her 
physician. It is significant that that decision to abort must be a matter 
of medical judgment as well as the mother's wish. At least it was such 
in the eyes of the U.S. Supreme Court but, as we have all seen, in the 
majority of cases, if not well in excess of 98% of the cases, no medical 
reasons exist to support the abortion. 25 
From the point of view of the physician who has been trained to 
preserve life, the legalization of homicide at the request of the actor is 
of very great significance primarily because the actor would be the 
physician. To understand euthanasia one must understand that we are 
focusing not on the conduct of the person dying, but on the conduct 
of the person who will participate in the act of killing that person, 
either voluntarily or involuntarily. Make no mistake about it, that 
person would be a physician. 
Suicide is not considered a crime and assisting at suicide is a crime 
in only a small number of jurisdictions.26 Although euthanasia is fre-
quently equated with assisted suicide,27 it is really something very 
different from the point of view of the physician. 28 The legalization 
of euthanasia is always sought on the basis that the physician would 
be the one who would assist in the killing. Under current arguments 
for legalization, it is the physician who is being asked to kill the 
person involved. In determining whether or not euthanasia should be 
legalized, society must focus on the act of the physician or the person 
administering the euthanasia to understand the nature of euthanasia 
under both our law and our medical-ethical concepts of what euth-
anasia is. Do we wish to legalize killing? In his famous article 29 Prof. 
Yale Kamisar answered that question "no," arguing from purely non-
religious grounds against mercy killing legislation that for the good of 
society there should be no exception to our universal societal expecta-
tions that we will not kill nor be killed. Any breach in that absolute he 
sees as the beginning of a slippery slope, the danger being that "legal 
machinery initially designed to kill those who are a nuisance to them-
selves may someday engulf those who are a nuisance to others." 
Those who would legalize euthanasia want it to be legalized so that a 
physician can kill someone who is desirous of euthanasia. This fact 
should not be glossed over or eliminated from any discussion of this 
important issue, especially by physicians. The legalization of euthanasia 
will make death an option or a treatment of choice in some circum-
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stances. Will the ideology of cost containment one day make it man-
datory? Before answering these questions we must understand that 
there is a vital distinction between killing and letting die. 30 
All men will one day be hopeless in the face of death. Anything we 
say or do is not going to alter that fact. We shall all die. The vital dis-
tinction is whether we shall die as a result of being allowed to die, or 
whether we shall die as a result of ourselves or others. 
Where there is no obligation to treat because treatment is not bene-
ficial and is therefore useless, treatment may be ceased and the patient 
may be allowed to die. Whether or not such a state has been reached 
by the patient is a medical judgment to be made by the attending 
physician. Direct intervention to end life is never licit. It is neither 
legal nor ethical. The use of drugs to alleviate pain and suffering in 
terminal patients is not only licit, but is a desired medical intervention 
to avoid unnecessary suffering. The distinction, however, between the 
positive act of killing and allowing a patient to die as a result of the 
natural disease which is killing him is of vital importance and should 
be understood by all. 
The distinction is really no different in the law than in moral or 
ethical matters. Where there is no duty to act there is no mandate to 
act and the physician and health personnel are excused from acting 
under those circumstances. The law only requires that a physician or 
nurse possess and exercise the skill and judgment of an ordinarily 
well-qualified physician or nurse in the same locale and under similar 
circumstances. Neither the means nor the ability are required to be 
extraordinary or heroic. It is not necessary that all available means be 
used to prolong life to its ultimate. Good medical judgment can be the 
basis for termination of treatment when that treatment is no longer 
beneficial to the patient. 
So, too, the patient may reject medical treatment.31 The cessation 
of medical treatment because it is useless or the rejection of medical 
treatment by a competent adult has never been considered to be sui-
cide or assisted suicide, either medically, legally or ethically. 32 
Those who would opt for the legalization of euthanasia are very 
prone to confuse these necessary ethical and legal distinctions. For 
example, Joseph Fletcher is fond of saying that the omission of extra-
ordinary or heroic means is just as much a decision to kill as is the 
positive act of euthanasia.33 True, the distinction between killing and 
letting die may be fine "but so are many other lines that men must 
draw in their fallible perception and limited wisdom." 34 The kinds of 
distinction and judgment that a physician makes when he determines 
that heroic means are no longer proper and necessary are the same 
kinds of distinctions and judgments that he makes daily during the 
course of his medical practice. The fact that he is making these deci-
sions with regard to a terminal patient should not deter him from 
making such judgments. There is nothing mysterious or extraordinary 
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happening in his practice when handling a terminal patient than when 
handling any other type of patient. Obviously this distinction between 
extraordinary and ordinary means of medical practice is difficult to 
ascertain and changes from day to day. In my opinion, a physician is 
better guided by determining whether or not the treatment will be 
beneficial to life, rather than trying to determine whether it is heroic 
or extraordinary. The importance . of the heroic or extraordinary 
aspect is that consideration of the problem in those terms allows 
consideration of familial difficulties, such as inability to pay for the 
proffered treatment. 
If cerebral brain death is not really death, then the use of cerebral 
brain death as a criterion for letting die would be legally unjustified. 
There are few cases to guide us in this area. In the California case of 
People u. Lyons 35 the jury was confronted with determining whether 
the bullet from a defendant's gun caused the death of the victim, or 
whether the death occurred as a result of the removal of organs from 
the deceased's body by the physicians. This case was not appealed and 
consequently there is no opinion of precedential value. However, the 
trial court used the following instruction to the jury: 
Death is the cessation of life. A person may be pronounced dead if, based 
on the usual and customary standards of medical practice, it has been deter-
mine d that the person has suffered an irreversible cessation of brain func-
tion .. . and since the deceased, Samuel Moore , was dead before the removal 
of his heart there was no issue of fact as to the cause of dea th .36 
The trial court relied on the medical testimony of two physicians of 
the California Medical Transplant Center. I am unable to determine 
whether or not the words "brain function" as understood by the 
physicians and the court meant only cerebral function or total brain 
function. In another nisi prius case, Tucker u. Lower,37 similar issues 
were involved and the court instructed the jury on both the traditional 
definition of death as contained in Black's Law Dictionary and as an 
alternative "the loss of brain function test." The Tucker case was not 
appealed and consequently no written opinion of precedential value 
exists. 
There is an issue concerning medical judgment which must be faced. 
If the physicians agree that total brain death is equivalent with being 
really dead, then society will eventUally come to that position also. 
However, the concept of cerebral brain death is objectionable because 
traditionally it has not been accepted, either medically, ethically or 
legally. In addition, it cannot properly be applied to otherwise coma-
tose people who have spontaneous respiration and circulation, but 
who are in some stage of deep coma. Ceasing to treat these people 
because the treatment is extraordinary does not resolve the question 
as to whether or not they are alive or dead. I think that no one 
disagrees that those people are alive as we understand it. They are 
neither dead nor brain dead. 
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v. 
Ethically our understanding of this problem must be based upon 
our understanding of respect for persons. Each person is a unique 
entity not only in the eyes of God, but in the eyes of the United States 
Constitution and the criminal law of all our states. A dying person is 
no less a person in the eyes of the law. Ethically he not only continues 
to be a person of infinite moral worth and humanity, he now has a 
greater claim on us and on our humanity because he is ill and helpless. 
Even more so, he has his claim upon the practitioner of the healing 
arts raised to a higher level because of his illness. Indeed, some courts 
have found the relationship between a physician and his patient to be 
of the highest legal relationship - that of a fiduciary. 
Each one of us deserves from each other the respect we all feel is 
due ourselves. That respect for a person means that we should be 
treated as an end in ourselves and never as a means towards an end. In 
addition, as each of us exists in this society we depend upon the 
covenant that each of us has with one another, that certain rules of 
the game - certain unspoken promises we have made to one 
another - will be followed by all of us. One of those rules or promises 
is that we will not kill one another. 
Such a burden rests even more heavily on the shoulders of the 
physician who, in addition to his moral role as an individual in this 
convenantial society, has opted to be the healer of those who need a 
practitioner of the healing arts. He, therefore, has a double duty to 
respect the individuality of the persons he is treating and to see in 
those persons the same degree of respect he would wish for himself 
were he in a similar circumstance. He must, in short, see persons as an 
end in themselves and never as a means towards an end. Acting thus he 
will do no harm. 
Arthur Dyck, Saltenstall Professor of Population Ethics at Harvard, 
has coined a new word to try to clarify the ethical debate about 
euthanasia.38 Those who opt for euthanasia in our society such as 
Marvin Kohl,39 use terminology such as beneficent euthanasia. Dyck, 
in order to distinguish a true death with dignity from mercy killing, 
uses the term benemortasia. Confining the words mercy killing and 
euthanasia as referring only to the deliberate inducement of a quick 
painless death, Dyck coins the word benemortasia to signify an ethic 
which rests on certain presuppositions about human dignity. Those 
who support mercy killing justify it when it is done out of a sense of 
kindness in order to obtain relief of suffering. 40 They wish to uphold 
the general prohibition against killing and limit its use only to relieve 
suffering in instances where suffering serves no useful purpose. Dyck 
argues that the desire and obligation to be merciful or kind do not 
commit us to a policy of euthanasia and that, indeed, such a policy 
has widespread effects which are not intended, but are foreseeable. 
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Although there are deep philosophical and religious differences which 
divide people on this issue, the injunction not to kill and the promise 
we have made one to the other that we will not kill, does not invite 
that type of division. For doctors that sense of divisiveness between 
themselves and their patients should be a crucial factor in determining 
whether or not they would opt for mercy killing as an alternative 
treatment of choice. In my opinion, that option undermines the rela-
tionship between physician and patient and will create a sense of 
distrust which will undermine not only the p~tient's sense of rapport 
with his physician, but the physician's own sense of rapport with his 
professionalism and his profession. 
Dyck argues compellingly that the point of the wedge argument is 
very simple when applied to the euthanasia debate. Killing is generally 
wrong and should be kept to as narrow a range of exceptions as 
possible. But beneficent euthanasia or mercy killing applies logically 
to a wide range of cases depending upon who is making the applica-
tion and, in particular, upon the ideology of the cost containment 
over ever-escalating health costs which loom on the horizon. In my 
opinion, there is no way to limit the application of beneficent eutha-
nasia or mercy killing to a narrow range of cases definitely circum-
scribed and carefully controlled. As in the case of abortion, to open 
the door and legalize mercy killing in one case is to legalize it in a full 
range of cases that are never contemplated by the progenitors of the 
policy. For these reasons even what appears as a small inroad into t he 
creation of this policy, namely cerebral brain death, must be opposed. 
However, if the irreversible cessation of total brain function is really 
death, which it appears to me and to most observers to be, then such a 
concept can be supported without creating the dangers of which I 
have spoken. 
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